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BASIC GRAINS: Marketing Channels and 
Financing at the Farm and Wholesale Levels 
1. Introduction 
Basic grains production has been a permanent concern 
among Honduran policy-makers. On the consumption side, they 
constitute the single most important component of the diet 
for a large majority of the population. On the production 
side, basic grains (especially corn) are grown by a large 
majority of the farmers in the country. Furthermore, small 
farmers account for a large share of the total production of 
grains, and they tend to allocate an important proportion of 
their land to the production of these crops. As a consequence, 
the goals of food self-sufficiency, on the one hand, and rural 
income on the other hand, underlie policy-makers' concern about 
basic grains production. This concern increased in the mid-
seventies as the status of grain-surplus economy disappeared, 
and the reliance on grain imports was growing. A complete 
review and analysis of these trends in basic grains production, 
trade and pricing patterns is provided in a separate report.!/ 
It is important to highlight here the effect that the 
overall stagnation and decline of the basic grains sector has 
had on government policies in general, and credit policies in 
particular. A special inter-institutional committee~/ was 
created to study and recommend policy actions directed to 
the basic grains sector. Basic grains constitute the 
!/ See Pollard, Graham, and Cuevas, "Coffee and Basic Grains: 
Review of Sectoral Performance and Pricing Patterns", 
January 1984. 
ij"Comisi6n Nacional de Granos Basicos." 
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most important concern of the "Institute Hondureno de 
Mercadeo Agricola" (IHMA), in charge of pricing, marketing, 
and external trade policies. The central bank initiated its 
rediscount lines of credit in the early 70's basically to 
support basic grains production and, to some extent, grain 
marketing. Since then, up to the present, basic grains 
loans have always had special concessionary interest rates 
to the borrowers. Also, these loans have benefitted from a 
100 percent rediscount policy at the central bank, and from 
several externally funded credit projects channelled through 
the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA). 
Loans to basic grains accounted for 2 percent of the 
value of new loans granted by the banking system in the per-
iod 1971-1976. This share decreased in the period 1976-1980 
to an average of 1.7 percent.ii In 1981-1982, the average 
proportion of new loans going to basic grains production had 
increased to almost 3 percent of the total amount of new 
loans in the banking system. Moreover, basic grains loans 
accounted for an average of over 12 percent of the value of 
new loans to agriculture in these same two years. Basic 
grains represented the second most important end-use among 
loans to crop agriculture (after coffee), accounting for al-
most 18 percent of the value of these loans. Public-sector 
concern about basic grains is evident when we consider the 
sources of these loans to the basic grains producing sector. 
Even though BANADESA provides only 26 percent of the total 
3/.0SU, "An Assessment of Rural Financial Markets in 
- 'Honduras,", 1981 
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value of new loans to agriculture (average 1981-1982), this 
bank is the source of more than 55 percent of the value of 
loans to basic grains. These loans accounted for almost 27 
percent of BANADESA's agriculture portfolio in 1981-1982, 
whereas the agriculture portfolio of commercial banks in 
these years included only 7.5 percent of loans to basic grains. 
Despite the efforts of public-sector entities, and 
preferential credit treatment to the basic grains sector, 
prQduction does not seem to respond as dynamically as policy-
makers may expect. Many of them have pointed at the market-
ing structure as an important, possibly crucial, bottle-neck 
in the flow of policy actions and price signals towards basic 
grains producers. Even the most concessionary credit poli-
cies may not succeed if the policy target is essentially a 
bad project in terms of its real rate of return. Therefore, 
if price-support policies and other marketing policies are 
not reaching the farmers effectively, these will not allocate 
to basic grains the resources policy-makers expect. This 
concern, shared by Honduran officials at the "Secretaria de 
Recurses Naturales" (SRN), the Central Bank, IHMA and 
BANADESA, inspired this study by the OSU Research Team. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the features of 
basic grains marketing at the farm level. We document and 
analyze the marketing channels utilized by basic grains pro-
ducers, prices received, marketing costs, and informal financ-
ing associated with marketing arrangements. The role of IHMA 
and its pricing policy receives particular attention in our 
work. The characteristics of private market intermediaries 
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(truckers, wholesalers, retailers) are also documented and 
analyzed, based on primary data obtained directly from these 
intermediaries. Our methodology is described in the next 
section. Survey results, and their analyses, are presented 
in Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 discusses the results of the 
interviews with basic grains producers, while the following 
section does the same with the interviews conducted among 
I 
market intermediaries. The final section includes our con-
eluding remarks, where implications with respect to the role 
of lHMA and marketing policies are highlighted. 
-5-
2. Methodology 
A field survey was conducted in August 1983 to investi-
gate the most relevant factors characterizing the basic grain 
marketing system in Honduras. Personal interviews were con-
ducted in nearly 70 locations comprising 5 of the 7 regions 
of the country. The survey provided almost 350 basic-grain 
farmer interviews, that were complemented with 50 additional 
interviews to intermediaries. The regions were chosen accord-
ing to their shares in overall basic-grains production, and 
their concentration of small and medium-size farms.!/ In anal-
yzing these geographical areas, random samples were drawn from 
records of Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Agricola (BANADESA) and 
selected private commercial banks. A sub-sample of farmers 
without institutional loans was obtained from among the farmers 
receiving technical assistance from the "Secretaria de Recurses 
Naturales" (SRN). This sub-sample improved the representative-
ness of the sample and allowed the investigation of possible 
associations between access to institutional credit and market-
ing patterns. 
The survey focused on the four basic grains: corn, rice, 
beans and sorghum. The sample unit was the grain producer, 
with or without formal financing, that sold some proportion 
of his last harvest. The survey questionnaires were designed 
to obtain information on the marketing channels utilized by 
basic grain producers, prices and other terms of marketing 
transactions, and informal financial arrangements concurrent 
!/ For analytical purposes, a farm with less than 10 manzanas 
was considered as "small", and those between 10 and 50 
manzanas were considered as "medium-size". 
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with these transactions. 
Information about the operation of private intermedi-
aries was collected from two sources: i) indirect informa-
tion provided by farmers and ii) direct information from 
intermediaries through personal interviews. The number of 
interviews with private intermediaries was necessarily lim-
ited due to some peculiar features of this little-known market-
sector. Intermediaries, especially truckers, were very dif-
ficult to locate since they were constantly traveling in search 
of qrain purchases. Also, in many cases, the references 
and directions given by the farmers were inaccurate or vague. 
The interviews were difficult to conduct because intermedi-
aries were usually involved in transactions or were busy 
loading or unloading trucks. In some instances, middlemen 
refused to give information about their business, due basical-
1 d . f f . . S/ y to istrust or ear o competition.-
It is important to note that in some cases it was diffi-
cult to classify the intermediary in a particular group 
(trucker, wholesaler, retailer). For instance, some truckers 
were also wholesalers or retailers and vice versa; there were 
intermediaries who sold grains both wholesale and retail, as well 
as farmers owning a vehicle acting as intermediaries. As a 
consequence, private intermediaries had to be classified 
rather arbitrarily according to their main activity. 
~/ During the period in which the survey was carried out, 
there was a shortage of grains in the country so that 
government supervision and price controls were enforced. 
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3. Results, Analysis and Implications 
3.1. Overview of the Sample, Main Crops and Access to Credit. 
A total of 347 interviews to grain farmers were con-
ducted in the following regions and departments: 
REGION DEPARTMENTS 
Sur Choluteca - Nacaome 
Central Comayagua 
Occidental Copan - Lempira 
Norte Cortes - Santa Barbara - Yoro 
Literal Norte Atlantida 
Corn, rice and beans were the most important grains planted 
by the farmers. Since late-season rice and sorghum production 
were insignificant in the sample, they are excluded from our 
analysis here. As shown in table 1, corn was the predominant 
grain cultivated in the two seasons. Moreover, corn was also 
the leading crop in terms of market significance for the farmer. 
Approximately 83 percent of the farmers who sold corn reported 
this crop as their most important grain crop in terms of sales. 
At the other extreme, beans were the least important grain crop 
' in terms of overall frequency in the sample and in marketing. On 
average, beans were marketed by almost 80 percent of the farmers 
who harvested them. However, this qrain was the most marketed 
gr~in for only 15 percent of the bean producers. 
For analytical purposes, farmers were classified in pro-
ducer groups as corn, rice, and bean producers according to 
the crop observed as the most relevant in terms of total sales. 
This classification will be utilized in what follows. Farmers 
Table 1. Number of Farmers Cultivating and Selling Grains, 
by Crop Season 
Crop Season 
Early Season 
Rice 
Corn 
Beans 
Late Season 
Corn 
Beans 
Number of 
Farmers Growing 
the Crop 
(1) 
97 
304 
94 
106 
86 
Number of 
Farmers Selling 
the Crop 
( 2) 
94 
270 
72 
65 
70 
Farmers Who 
Reported Each Grain 
as the Most Important 
in Terms of Sales 
No. (3) (3/2) % 
59 62.7 
223 82.6 
10 13.9 
21 32.3 
11 15.7 
.!/The proportion of farmers selling the crop (column 2) with respect to the number of 
farmers growing the crop (column 1) cannot be interpreted as the "degree of commer-
cialization" in the sample, since this was drawn precisely trying to include farmers 
that had effectively sold some of their harvest. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
I 
00 
I 
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tended to specialize in one grain crop and presented a low 
degree of grain crop diversification. This is evident for 
corn and rice producers (see table 2) comparing the average 
harvest obtained in the main crop with those corresponding 
to the other grain crops. For bean producers, however, even 
though beans were the most important marketed crop, the main 
crop in terms of production was corn. This is reflecting 
the importance of corn for farmers' consumption. 
The average area devoted to the main crop is shown in 
table 3. In general, the area occupied by the main crop did 
not represent a large proportion of the total area of the 
farm. Corn producers utilized 13 percent of the total land to 
gro~ corn in the early season, and only 3 percent in the late 
season. Rice producers, however, devoted about one-third of 
their land to plant rice. 
As shown in table 4, the sample included 136 farmers who 
received credit in at least one of the last two crop seasons 
and 211 producers who did not receive formal credit in either 
of the last two harvests. Only 6 percent of the farmers ob-
tained credit in the two crop seasons, approximately 40 per-
cent received a loan in at least one of the seasons, while 
60 percent did not receive institutional credit in any crop 
season. 
Among farmers receiving loans from institutions, the 
average loan size received from BANADESA in the early season 
was 5,647 Lempiras. In the second season, the average loan 
size was 3,052 Lempiras (see table 5). Only six farmers 
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Table 2. Farm Production Structure by Crop Season. l/ 
Average Harvest per Producer, in Quintales,-
by Producer Group 
Producer Group 2/ 
Crop Season Rice Corn Bean 
Early Season 
Rice 370 13 
Corn 57 316 65 
Beans 7 6 20 
Late Season 
Corn 9 206 
Beans 2 4 26 
1/1 Quintal = 100 pounds. 
2/Defined according to the most important crop in terms 
of sales. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
Table 3. Average Size of Farm and Area of Crop by Farmer Group 
and Crop Season, in Manzanas!/ 
Crop Season/ Number of Average Main Crop 
Farmer Group Farmers Farm Size Area, Average 
Early Season 
Rice Producers 59 48 mz. 16 mz. 
Corn Producers 223 68 9 
Bean Producers 10 76 12 
Late Season 
Corn Producers 21 102 3 
Bean Producers 11 12 3 
!/1 Manzana (mz.) = 0.7 hectares. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
Main Crop Farm 
Area Area 
33.3% 
13.2 
15.9 
I 
1--' 
I--' 
2.9 I 
25.0 
-12-
Table 4. Basic Grain Producers in the Sample, Classified 
by Credit Access and Crop Season 
Late Season 
Early Season With Credit Without Credit Total 
With Credit 21 103 124 
Without Credit 12 211 223 
Total 33 314 347 
Percentage 9.5 90.5 100 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
% 
35.7 
64.3 
100 
Table 5. Credit fro~ Instituti~ns. N~rnbel/of Loans, Average Loan Size 
and Loan Size Range, in Lempiras-
Number of Loans 
Average Size, L. 
Minimum Value, L. 
Maximum Value, L. 
Coefficient of 
Variation (%) 
BANADESA 
(Early Season) 
110 
5,647 
160 
63,000 
141.0 
.!f 2 Lempiras (L.) = 1 U.S. dollar. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
BANADESA 
(Late Season) 
29 
3,052 
100 
13,000 
102.9 
Private Banks 
(Early Season) 
6 
5,480 
2,000 
8,000 
35.9 I I-' 
VJ 
I 
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reported loans from private banks, all of them in the first 
(e~rly) growing season.~/ In this case, the average loan 
size was 5,480 Lempiras. There was a large dispersion in the 
BANADESA loan size distribution, while private bank loans 
we~e highly concentrated around the average loan size, as 
indicated by the coefficients of variation presented in 
table 5. 
Loans received from BANADESA in the first (early) season 
were the most numerous among all sources, thus allowed further 
analysis of their distribution by loan size and farm size. 
These results are shown in table 6. Nearly 55 percent of the 
borrowers received loans between 1,000 and 5,000 Lempiras. 
These credits were obtained mainly by the smallest farmers, 
i.e., those with less than 50 manzanas of land. On the other 
hand, only 11 percent of the farmers received loans of more 
than 10,000 Lempiras. These credits were obtained primarily 
by farmers owning the largest farms (over 100 manzanas). 
3.2 Marketing Channels. 
One of the purposes of the survey was to identify the 
main marketing channels used by basic-grain farmers in sell-
ing their output. During the interviews, farmers were asked 
about the buyers of their product and the main features of 
their transactions. The types of intermediaries explicitly 
considered were: the Institute Hondureno de Mercadeo Agri-
cola (IHMA), wholesalers, processing firms (mills and "bene-
~/ No financing was reported from private banks in the late 
season, or from cooperatives or any other financial insti-
tution in any season. 
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Table 6. BANADESA Loans in the Early Crop Season, Number of 
Borrowers by Loans Size and Farm Size. 
Loan Size Farm Size (Manzanas) 
(Lempiras) 0-10 10-50 50-100 Over 100 Total % 
0-1,000 4 7 2 1 14 14.6 
1,000-5,000 10 26 9 7 62 54.2 
5,000-10,000 2 3 7 7 19 19.8 
Over 10,000 0 3 1 7 11 11.4 
Total 16 39 19 22 96!/ 100.0 
Percentage 16.7 40.6 19.8 22.9 100 
!/This total does not coincide with the total number of loans 
indicated in Table 5 (110) because of missing observations. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
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ficios"), "coyotes".Z./, farmers, and other buyers.~/ Table 7 
shows the marketing shares of different buyers, in terms of 
the proportion of farmers in the sample selling to each 
type of buyer. 
Wholesalers, IRMA and other buyers in that order, were 
the most important buyers overall. About 24 percent of the 
farmers sold their harvest to IRMA, whereas 76 percent sold 
to private intermediaries. There is no strong evidence that 
"coyotes" (truckers) control the market of grains at the farm 
level, since only 14 percent of the farmers marketed their 
harvests through this type of intermediary. However, as 
pointed out before, the classification of private intermedi-
aries is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, if 
truckers are grouped with wholesalers, their market share 
becomes 50 percent of the number of suppliers, a proportion 
that doubles the significance of IRMA as a marketing channel. 
"Beneficios" and mills prefer to deal with a few wholesalers 
instead of a large number of individual producers, according 
to the information supplied by managers and owners of these 
firms. This explains the low percentage of farmers who sold 
grain to processing firms (7.4 percent). The results presented 
in table 7 show that it is not common that farmers purchase 
grains from other farmers, either for consumption or for fur-
ther selling. Only a small proportion of the farmers (1.6 percent) 
declared having sold grain to other farmers. 
?./ 
~/ 
A nickname given to truckers, who are usually blamed for 
the high prices charged to consumers and the low prices 
received by producers. 
Includes retailers, friends, relatives, cooperatives, 
feedstuff producers, and packing firms. 
Table 7. Marketing Channels: Shares of Different Buyers, by Farm Size of Producer. 
Marketing 
Channel 
IHMA 
Wholesaler 
Processing Firm 
Trucker ("coyote") 
Other Farmers 
0 h I d . . 1/ t er nterme 1ar1es-
Total 
Smallest 
(less than 10 mz.) 
20.8% 
54.2 
4.2 
8.3 
12.5 
100.0 
Farm Size 
Small Medium 
(10-50 mz.) (50-100 mz.) 
24.4% 29.4% 
36.6 29.4 
8.5 5.9 
12.2 20.6 
18.3 14.7 
100.0 100.0 
.!_/Includes retailers, friends, relatives, cooperatives, livestock-food producers 
and packing firms. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
Large Total 
(over 100 mz.) 
22.0% 24.2% 
34.0 36.8 
8.0 7.4 
14.0 13.7 
6.0 1.6 I 
1--l 
16.0 16.3 -....J I 
100.0 100.0 
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Wholesalers were particularly important among the 
smallest group of producers, i.e., those with less than 10 
manzanas of land. More than 50 percent of these farmers 
sold their grains to wholesalers. The relative participation 
of IHMA as a marketing channel tended to increase with the 
size of the farm. Twenty percent of the smallest farmers 
dealt with IHMA, while almost 30 percent of the medium-size 
producers did so. It is interesting to note that IHMA had a 
quite similar participation among both the smallest and the 
largest group of the distribution in terms of the proportion 
of producers that sold grain to this institution (approximate-
ly 20 percent) • "Coyotes" were not very important as a mar-
keting channel for the small farm sizes. However, they were 
more significant in the case of medium-size farms (50 to 100 
manzanas). 
3.3. Producer Groups and Marketing Channels 
Analysis by group of producers (defined according to their 
main crop) showed the same pattern of marketing channels dis-
cussed in the preceding section. As shown in table 8, whole-
salers were the most important agents used by producers who 
planted grains in the early season.~/ These intermediaries 
purchased from 35 percent of the farmers interviewed, while 
IHMA was the second most important channel with 24 percent of 
the suppliers. Truckers presented a relatively low share of 
the markets in terms of the number of farmers selling to these 
~/ The late season was not very significant in terms of market-
ing, therefore we focus our analysis here on the results 
obtained for the early season. 
Table a. Marketing Channel Used in the Early Season. Shares of Different Buyers by 
Producer Group. 
Producers Group!/ 
Rice Corn Bean 
Marketing Channel Producers Producers Producers Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
IHMA -4- 6.9 65 30.0 69 24.3 
Wholesaler 25 43.1 70 32.3 4 44.5 99 34.9 
Processing firm 11 19.0 7 3.2 18 6.3 
Trucker ("coyote") 13 22.4 28 12.9 2 22.2 43 15.2 
Other farmers 4 1. 8 4 1. 4 
Other intermediaries 5 8.6 43 19.8 3 33.3 51 17.9 
Total 58 100.0 217 100.0 9 100.0 284 100.0 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
!/Defined according to the most important crop in terms of sales. 
I 
1--' 
\.0 
I 
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intermediaries. As a group, however, wholesalers and truckers 
acaount for 50 percent of the basic grains market. The share 
of private intermediaries, especially wholesalers and truckers, 
is higher for rice than it is for corn. In the first case, 
private intermediaries account for 93 percent of the trans-
actions, with wholesalers and truckers representing, as a 
group, 65 percent of the total. In the case of corn, however, 
IHMA was almost as important as private wholesalers, with ap-
proximately 30 percent of the market. The combined share of 
wholesalers and truckers was 45 percent in this case. 
Tables 9 and 10 summarize the relative importance of the 
factors determining the choice of a marketing channel by the 
farmers interviewed in the survey. In all cases (excepting 
a small number of "other intermediaries" in the case of rice) 
the main reason underlying the choice of a particular buyer 
was "best price" offered. All most important intermediaries, 
both IHMA and private, were chosen because of the price offered 
in the majority of the cases. There is no strong indication 
of market concentration in either corn or rice. The reasons 
that could be associated with some kind of monopsonistic power, 
"only buyer" or "nearest buyer" (geographic monopsony), 
accounted for 28 percent of the cases in rice marketing, and 
24 percent in the case of corn. Therefore, according to our 
results , price-competition seems to predominate in the market-
ing of basic grains at the farm level. 
Prices received by farmers are compared in table 11. In 
grain marketing transactions, farmers usually have to cover 
Table 9. Rice Producers: Main Factors Determining the Choice of a Marketing Channel. 
Number of Respondents and Percent of Farmers Selling to Each Buyer. 
Factor 
Only Best . Nearest Prior Best Price and 
Marketing Channel Buyer Price Buyer Arra·ngement Prior Arr. Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
IHMA -2- 50 -1- 25 -1- 25 -4- 100 
Wholesaler 5 20 14 56 1 4 3 12 2 8 25 100 
Processing firm 1 9 8 73 1 9 1 9 11 100 
Trucker ( n coyote") 3 23 5 38 1 8 4 31 13 100 I 
N 
Other farmers I-' I 
Other intermediaries 3 60 1 20 1 20 5 100 
Total 12 21 30 52 4 7 9 15 3 5 58 100 
Source: osu Survey, August 1983. 
Table 10. Corn Producers: Main Factors Determining the Choice of a Marketing Channel. 
Number of Respondents and Percent of Farmers Selling to Each Buyer. 
Only Best Nearest Prior Other 
Marketing Channel Buyer Price Buyer Ar·rangement Reason Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
IHMA 56 90 6 10 62 100 
Wholesaler 13 19 38 57 8 12 3 5 5 7 67 100 
Processing Firm 2 29 3 43 1 14 1 14 7 100 
Trucker ("coyote 11 ) 2 7 17 61 5 18 2 7 2 7 28 100 
I 
[\.) 
Other farmers 1 25 1 25 1 25 1 25 4 100 [\.) I 
Other intermediaries 9 23 10 26 8 21 4 10 8 21 39 100 
Total 27 13 125 60 22 11 17 8 16 8 207 100 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
Table 11. Corn: Average Price Received by Producers in the Early Season from 
IHMA and Private Intermediaries, in Lempiras per Quintal 
Marketing Channel 
IHMA 
Private Intermediaries 
Support!/ 
Price 
17.25 
Gross~/ 
Price 
18.14 
16.93 
Sellingl./ 
Cost 
2.69 
0.45 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983, except support price. 
!/ Price paid in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. Source: IHMA. 
~/ Selling price quoted by the farmer. 
Net No. of 
Price Observations 
15.45 65 
16.48 154 
l_I Transaction costs associated with the sales - Includes transportation expenses, 
bags, special trips to deliver the grain and obtain payments, imputed costs of 
farmer's time spent in these procedures. Also includes explicit and implicit 
costs of obtaining the "carnet de productor" when this was required by the 
purchaser (IHMA). 
I 
rv 
w 
I 
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some expenses associated with the sale, such as traveling 
costs, bags, loading costs, as well as the opportunity cost 
of time spent when the farmer has to make special trips to 
deliver the product or collect the payments. Furthermore, 
when farmers sell to IHMA there are additional costs that 
must be covered, such as the transportation of the grain to 
the IHMA buying station and the explicit and implicit expenses 
associated with the obtainment of the "carnet de productor", 
a special card required to sell to this institution that has 
to be obtained from "Recurses Naturales". Table 11 shows 
that the gross price paid by IHMA for corn was the highest, 
compared to that paid on average by private intermediaries.lo/ 
On average, farmers received a gross price even greater than 
the official price announced by IHMA for the main markets 
(Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula). However, the attractiveness 
of such price was indeed off set by the high cost per quintal 
associated with IHMA transactions, almost 6 times as high as 
the costs involved in selling to other buyers (see table 11) . 
On average, farmers had to incur a cost of 2.69 lempiras per 
quintal sold to IHMA while producers who dealt with private 
buyers paid only 0.45 Lempiras. Consequently, farmers received, 
on average, a lower net price from IHMA than from other inter-
mediaries. Despite the difference observed on net prices, 
IHMA can still be considered a very important marketing channel. 
Furthermore, as was noted in table 10, the majority of corn 
.l.Q_/ Our analysis is limited here to corn producers, since 
this is the crop with the largest number of observations 
in the sample. 
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proqucers selling to IHMA based their decision on the price 
paid by this institution. These results suggest that farmers 
may .not be fully aware of the explicit and implicit costs 
the~ have to cover when they sell to any intermediary in gen-
eral and to IHMA in particular. The information obtained in 
the survey did not show evidence of truckers ("coyotes") trying 
to take advantage of farmers by offering lower prices. In fact, 
the average gross price paid by "coyotes" (17.7 L./qq) was 
slightly higher than the average gross price paid by private 
intermediaries as a whole. 
In order to investigate the existence of informal or 
implicit financial arrangements associated with marketing 
transactions, the survey obtained information about the use 
of "anticipos". These are advances, either in cash or in kind, 
that farmers received from buyers. While intensively used in 
the past as a way to secure grain purchases, our results show 
that these advances are no longer a frequent practice among 
buyers. Interviews to different intermediaries indicated that 
most of them considered any kind of advance as "bad business" 
since it is difficult to recover the money or the equipment 
given to farmers if these farmers decide to default the agree-
ment. However, some intermediaries still give advances to 
some qualified farmers. Data obtained from the survey seem 
to confirm the current reluctance toward the practice of giving 
advances (see table 12). In general, less than 10 percent of 
all farmers received cash in advance. 111 
11/ Advances in the form of services or in kind were prac-
tically non-existent among the farmers interviewed. 
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Table 12. Number of Farmers Receiving Cash Advances, and 
Average Amounts, By Crop Season and Producer Group 
Average Length of 
Crop Season/ Percentage Average Time Before the 
Producer Group Number of Total Amount {Lps.) Harvest {Months) 
Early Season 
Rice Producers 11 18.6% 862.2 3.5 
Corn Producers 17 7.6 2384.0 2.3 
Bean Producers 1 10.0 100.0 1. 3 
Late Season 
Corn Producers 2 9.5 500.0 1. 0 
Bean Producers 
Overall Sample 31 9.6 1648.s.!/ 2.61/ 
!/ Weighted average. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
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The amount received varied among producers. Corn producers 
received the largest advance in the early season. On average, 
they obtained almost three times the amount received by rice 
producers. However, cash advances were given with more antici-
pation to rice farmers. This could reflect the intermediary's 
intention to minimize the risk of default by shortening the 
pe~iod in the case of farmers receiving the largest advances. 
To give guarantee of purchase seemed to be a more usual 
practice than advances. Table 13 shows that, in general, 
almost 25 percent of the farmers received such guarantee no 
less than 30 days before the harvest. Among producer groups, 
guarantee of purchase was important, especially for rice pro-
ducers. Thirty percent of them were assured to sell their 
crop nearly two months before the harvest. Interviews to 
farmers revealed that guarantee of purchase is neither required 
nor accepted by many farmers. They argued that these guaran-
tees imply obligation to sell to a particular buyer who will 
not always pay the best price. 
3.4. Access to Credit and Marketing Patterns. 
In order to analyze the survey results from a different 
perspective, farmers were divided into two groups: those who 
received institutional loans and those who did not receive 
financial assistance from institutions in the last two harvests. 
Table 14 shows the relationship between access to institutional 
credit and the relative importance of different marketing 
channels. Wholesalers and IHMA were the most important 
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Table 13. Number of Farmers Receiving Guarantee of Purchase, 
by Crop Season and Producer Group 
Crop Season/ Percentage Average Length of Time 
Producer Group Number of Total Before the Harvest 
(months} 
Early Season 
Rice Producers 18 30. 5 % 1.9 
Corn Producers 51 22.9 1.8 
Bean Producers 2 20.0 1.7 
Late Season 
Corn Producers 3 14.3 1.0 
Bean Producers 2 18.2 0.5 
Overall Sample 76 23.4 1.71/ 
!/weighted average. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
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Table 14. Marketing Channels and Access to Credit. Shares 
of Different Buyers for Farmers With and Without 
Institutional Credit 
Farmers 
Marketing Channel With Credit Without Credit Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
IHMA 43 32.8 28 13.6 71 21.1 
Wholesalers 45 34.3 72 34.9 117 34.7 
Processing Plants 12 9.2 8 3.9 20 5.Q 
Truckers ("coyotes") 13 9.9 43 21.0 56 16.6 
Other Farmers 1 0.8 3 1.4 4 1.2 
Other Intermediaries 17 13.0 52 25.2 69 20.5 
Total 131 100.0 206 100.0 337 100.0 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
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marketing channels among farmers with loans. These two 
intermediaries together bought grain from 67 percent of the 
farmers, and their relative importance was quite similar 
(34 percent and 33 percent respectively). Only 10 percent 
of the farmers with credit marketed crops through truckers 
("coyotes"). Wholesalers were also the main buyer group among 
farmers without credit, but the relative importance of IHMA 
in this group decreased significantly. While dealing with 
33 percent of the farmers with credit, IHMA was the marketing 
channel used by only 14 percent of the producers without 
formal credit. The opposite situation happened with respect 
to truckers, whose relative marketing participation doubled 
to 20 percent of the farmers in the group without institutional 
loans. 
The main factors explaining the choice of marketing chan-
nel, according to the farmer's access to institutional credit are 
summarized in table 15. Again, "best price" was the main con-
sideration for both groups of farmers. Some 60 percent of 
farmers with formal loans indicated this reason as the most 
important in selecting a marketing channel. This same reason 
was indicated in 51 percent of the cases by farmers without 
institutional credit. A small proportion of farmers with 
loans (approximately 18 percent) had only one option to sell, 
while 12 percent of the farmers without loans had only one 
possible buyer. The large proportion of the farmers selling 
their crops based on prices offered and the relatively small 
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Table 15: Main Factors Determining the Choice of A Marketing 
Channel, by Access to Institutional Credit. 
Farmers 
Factors With Credit Without Credit 
No. % No. % 
Only buyer 25 18.4 24 11. 8 
Best price 82 60.3 103 50.7 
Nearest buyer 11 8.9 22 11. 4 
Prior arrangement 8 5.9 22 10.8 
To help buyer 5 3.7 22 10.8 
Other reason 4 2.8 9 4.5 
Total 136 100.0 203 100.0 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
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percentage of farmers who had only one buyer suggest the 
prevalence of a significant degree of competition in the 
Honduran grain market at the farm level. 
Among the producers without loans, considerations other 
than price, such as the geographical location of the buyer, 
prior arrangements, and friendship were also relevant. One-
third of these farmers chose their buyers following these 
criteria, which are more closely associated with wholesalers 
and truckers ("coyotes"). 
In general, farmers with institutional credit had more 
access to IHMA than those without formal loans. This can be 
explained by the purchasing policy followed by IHMA that gives 
preference to farmers having loans with BANADESA. This link-
age attempts to improve loan recovery for BANADESA and improve 
marketing conditions for BANADESA borrowers. Our results 
suggest that producers without formal loans are induced to 
market their crops through wholesalers and "coyotes", even 
though this does not necessarily imply a disadvantage in terms 
f . . d 12/ o net prices receive .~ 
12/ Further data processing, in progress, should determine 
whether the average net price received by non-credit 
farmers from private intermediaries is similar to that 
reported in table 11 for all farmers. 
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4. The Operations of Intermediaries 
The survey of grain producers was complemented with 
interviews to different intermediaries in order to provide 
insights into the main features of their activities. These 
intermediaries were located in the same areas where the 
farm-level survey was conducted. A total of 50 interviews 
were carried out among market intermediaries that were 
classified into four groups. The relative importance of 
these groups in the sample is shown in table 16. Some fea-
tures of the intermediaries' business organizations are 
presented in table 17. Most of them are owners of the 
building where their activities are carried out. A large 
proportion of them (44 percent) hire permanent workers who 
are in charge of the business while they are involved in 
other activities. In fact, only 14 percent of the inter-
mediaries interviewed had grain trade as their only economic 
activity. Agriculture, cattle and commerce were found among 
the main complementary activities, with different degrees of 
relative importance. Temporary workers are employed for short 
periods only during the harvest season, in quantities that 
depend on the scale of operation. 
Intermediaries have several sources of financing. Own 
resources were indicated as a source of funds in 48 percent of 
the interviews. Nearly 40 percent use formal loans from in-
stitutions, while informal loans or cash advances from buyers 
were mentioned in only 6 percent of the interviews. Other 
miscellaneous sources of funds accounted for 14 percent of 
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Table 16. Number of Interviews in the Sample 
by Type of Intermediary 
Intermediary Number 
Wholesaler 12 
Processing Firms 10 
Truckers ( 11 coyotes 11 ) 17 
Others1/ 11 
Total 50 
% 
24.0 
20.0 
34.0 
22.0 
100.0 
l/Includes other intermediaries, such as retailers, cooperatives, 
and private groups. 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
Table 17. Selected Features of Intermediaries' Activities. 
Proportion of Intermediaries in Each Case 
Rent Building 
Hire Permanent Workers 
Hire Temporary Workers 
During.Harvest Time 
Buy and Sell Grain as Only 
Economic Activity 
Yes 
36.0% 
44.0 
70.0 
14.0 
Source: OSU Survey, August 1983. 
No 
64.0% 
56.0 
30.0 
86.0 
Total 
100.0% 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
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the cases. Most of the intermediaries interviewed declared 
having more than one source of financing for their market-
ing activities. 
Our observations in the field indicate that farmers 
(and truckers) are basically price takers. Prices are set 
by buyers according to some reference variables. The survey 
found that market price and quality of the grain were the 
most important decision variables used by intermediaries to 
set the price. Some 70 percent of buyers utilized these two 
criteria. Even though quality is widely used, intermediaries 
argued that they are not as strict as IRMA in this matter. 
Some of them used to buy the whole quantity offered by the 
farmers, regardless of quality considerations, as a way to 
secure suppliers for the next harvest. When supply is abundant, 
however, intermediaries refuse to buy damaged grain. Other 
factors taken into account to establish the price are IRMA 
price, prices offered by other buyers closer to the retail 
level, and information about production costs. Season was 
mentioned as a factor influencing price-setting in 34 percent 
of the cases. Price is generally independent of the purchased 
quantity so that price discrimination based on volume does not 
seem to be a usual practice. 
There is no unique pattern in grain gathering. Buyers go 
out to the farms looking for grain, as well as farmers take 
their harvest to purchasing places in search of the best price. 
Buyers who go to the farms usually pay the costs of shipping 
the grain (transportation, bags, workers). 
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With respect to market structure, our results suggest 
a high degree of competition in the Honduran grain market at 
the farm-gate level. The survey did not find buyers acting 
as monopsonists in any region. Despite the fact that most of 
them bought the grain always in the same area (74 percent), 
and from the same farmers (60 percent), none of them had com-
plete control of the supply of grain in the area. In other 
words, it seems that buyers try to build a buyer-seller rela-
tionship that is difficult to keep due to the presence of a 
large number of competitors interacting in the same market. 
According to information provided by buyers who had market 
agreements with other intermediaries (30 percent of intermed-
iaries interviewed) , these agreements are almost impossible to 
enforce in practice. Price agreements are the most frequent 
but are usually violated due to the strong competition. 
A lack of direct communication was observed among buyers. 
However, there was perfect knowledge about prices paid, for 
instance, each wholesaler knew the price offered by his neiqh-
bor. They also knew when a farmer or trucker was trying to 
sell grain previously rejected by IHMA, thus giving them a 
better position to set a price. Market agreements work better 
among processing firms (mills and "beneficios"), especially 
with respect to quality standards. Quantity agreements among 
wholesalers were observed in small oligopolistic segments of 
the market. Under these agreements, sellers were forced to deal 
with only one buyer. The quantity traded was then equally 
shared among the small group of buyers participating in the 
agreement. 
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Some 50 percent of the intermediaries interviewed used 
to give cash in advance ("anticipo") to farmers, and to a 
lesser extent, to truckers. On average, advances are given 
about two months before the harvest, with a maximum of five 
months. They are usually requested by farmers when they visit 
the buyers to offer the grain and find out about prices. There 
is ~no general procedure for calculating the advance. A few 
intermediaries estimate the advance as a fixed percentage of 
the crop value. When this procedure is used, this proportion 
of the crop value varies according to the size of the crop and 
sometimes depends on the degree of knowledge the buyer has about 
the farmer, i.e., well-known farmers receive larger advances 
than new farmers. In the first case, buyers give producers the 
amount they request. For new farmers, the advance is given 
according to the farmer's needs, which are estimated on the 
basis of cost per manzana. In other cases, the advance is 
given regardless of the farmer's needs on a "take-it-or-leave-it" 
ba~is. No explicit interest rates are charged on advances, 
allegedly as a way of securing the future supply of grain. This 
same objective is pursued through other mechanisms such as the 
provision of some services including technical assistance, pro-
vision of seeds, bags, equipment, transportation, land and other 
non-pecuniary services. Intermediaries also try to attract 
farmers by paying immediately upon delivery of the harvest, so 
that the opportunity cost of the farmer is reduced. Guarantee 
of purchase is also offered with the same purpose. In selling 
th~ grain, however, intermediaries seem to work under different 
conditions. A very small proportion of intermediaries sold the 
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grain under some kind of obligation {12 percent) and an even 
I 
smaller percentage received services from their buyers {4 per-
cent). These buyers were usually other intermediaries further 
up in the marketing chain between farmers and consumers. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The results presented in the foregoing sections have 
prqvided useful insights into the characteristics of basic-
grains markets, primarily at the farm-gate level. Several 
features of the operations of intermediaries have been 
described as well, using primary data obtained in direct 
interviews with these marketing agents. 
Private intermediaries, as a group, were found to be 
the most important marketing channel used by basic-grain 
producers. Overall, wholesalers are the single most important 
marketing channel, with some 37 percent of the total number 
of transactions, while IRMA accounted for approximately 24 
I 
percent of the market, in terms of number of producers. The 
market share of wholesalers and truckers ("coyotes") taken 
together is 50 percent of the total number of suppliers, while 
truckers alone accounted for only 14 percent of the transac-
tians. 
Gross prices paid by IHMA were, on average, the highest 
received by basic-grain producers. However, after deducting 
the explicit and implicit transaction costs incurred by farm-
ers dealing with this institution, net prices received in 
transactions with IHMA were lower than average net prices re-
ceived from private intermediaries. Farmers did not seem to 
be fully aware of these differences in selling costs, 
po~sibly because of a different perception of the implicit 
costs involved. Transaction costs of selling to IRMA were 
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6 times as high as those associated with sales to private 
intermediaries. These results suggest the need to revise 
IH~A procedures in order to reduce the transaction costs that 
I 
these procedures imply. 
IHMA operations were found to be more important among 
farmers with credit than among farmers without access to in-
stitutional sources of finance. This is explained by existing 
IHMA-BANADESA arrangements that favor borrowers from BANADESA 
with the purpose of improving the bank's loan recovery per-
formance. As a consequence, farmers without access to insti-
tutional loans tend to be excluded from IHMA purchases, and 
are induced to market their crops primarily through wholesalers 
and truckers ("coyotes"). 
According to our results, price-competition seems to pre-
dominate in the marketing of basic grains at the farm level. 
All marketing channels were chosen on the basis of prices 
offered. Monopsonostic or oligopolistic features were found 
in less than 30 percent of the cases. Intermediaries on the 
other hand, did not recognize any kind of monopsonistic power, 
though some degree of collusion appears in specific transac-
tions. Intermediaries tend to set the price in transactions 
with both farmers and truckers, but we did not find signs of 
collusion among intermediaries for price-setting purposes. 
Market intermediaries cannot be considered a significant 
source of informal financing for basic-grains producers. Cash 
advances or advances in the form of services in kind are not 
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frequent practices between buyers and farmers. Less than 
10 1 percent of all basic-grains farmers had received some 
kind of advance from market intermediaries. Intermediaries, 
inlturn, seem to use cash advances on a limited basis to 
secure the supply from preferred customers. Immediate pay-
ment and guarantee of purchases were other means of attract-
in~ potential suppliers. 
The main policy implications of our results refer to, 
the need of reducing transaction costs associated with IHMA 
procedures. In general, IHMA operations appear to have a 
positive effect on market prices and market structure. The 
institution accounts for about one-fourth of market trans-
actions and its price policy has apparently induced private 
in~ermediaries to offer similar price levels. The competi-
tiveness of basic-grain marketing at the farm level has con-
tributed to these results of IHMA marketing policies. 
